## Agree to Agree: Appendix

## Appendix A: Variable Codings

For the BES, it is noted next to each item whether the statement is left-wing, right-wing, libertarian, or authoritarian in its direction. All of the scales where constructed to range from 0 (left/libertarian) to 4 (right/authoritarian). Since survey weights are used throughout unless otherwise stated, the BES respondents without survey weights were not included all parts of the following analysis.

## BSA Likert Scales

The statements utilised in the BSA economic dimension (ranging from Disagree Strongly to Agree Strongly) are as follows:

- Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off
- Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers
- Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth
- There is one law for the rich and one for the poor
- Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance

The statements utilised in the BSA second dimension (ranging from Disagree Strongly to Agree Strongly) are as follows:

- Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values
- People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences
- For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence
- Schools should teach children to obey authority
- The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong
- Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards


## BES Likert Scales

The statements utilised in the BES economic dimension (ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) are as follows:

- Ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation's wealth (right)
- There is one law for the rich and one for the poor (left)
- There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees' working conditions and wages (right)
- Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems (right)
- Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership (left)
- It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one (left)

The statements utilised in the BES second dimension (ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) are as follows:

- Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values (auth)
- Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards (auth)
- People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government (lib)
- People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives (lib)
- For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence (auth)
- People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences (auth)


## BESIP Likert Scales

- $\operatorname{lr} 1:$ Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off
- lr2: Big business takes advantage of ordinary people
- lr3: Ordinary working people do not get teir fair share of the nation's wealth
- lr4: There is one law for the rich and one for the poor
- lr5: Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance

The wordings of the libertarian-authoritarian statements are:

- al1: Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional authority
- al2: For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence
- al3: Schools should teach children to obey authority
- al4: Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards
- al5: People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences


## BESIP Extra Likert Scales

The statements on the zero-sum scale are:

- zero1: One person's loss is another person's gain (zero-sum)
- zero4: There's only so much to go around. Life is about how big a slice of the pie you can get. (zero-sum)
- zero5: Life isn't about winners and losers, everyone can do well (everyone can win)
- zero7: The only way to make someone better off is to make someone else worse off (zero-sum)
- zero9: There are ways to make everyone better off without anyone losing out (everyone can win)
- zero11: Everyone can be a winner at the same time (everyone can win)

The statements from the empathy scale are:

- empathy1: I can usually figure out when my friends are scared (empathetic)
- empathy2: I can usually realize quickly when a friend is angry (empathetic)
- empathy3: I can usually figure out when people are cheerful (empathetic)
- empathy4: I am not usually aware of my friends' feelings (unempathetic)
- empathy5: When someone is feeling 'down' I can usually understand how they feel (empathetic)
- empathy6: After being with a friend who is sad about something, I usually feel sad (empathetic)
- empathy7: My friends' unhappiness doesn't make me feel anything (unempathetic)
- empathy8: Other people's feelings don't bother me at all (unempathetic)
- empathy9: I don't become sad when I see other people crying (unempathetic)
- empathy10: My friends' emotions don't affect me much (unempathetic)


## Education Recodes

Table A1: BSA Education Recode

| Original Coding | New Coding |
| :--- | :--- |
| Postgraduate degree | Postgrad |
| First degree | Undergrad |
| Higher educ below degree | A-level/equiv |
| A level or equiv | A-level/equiv |
| O level or equiv | GCSE/equiv |
| CSE or equiv | GCSE/equiv |
| Foreign or other | Missing |
| No qualification | No Qualification |

Table A2: BES Education Recode

| Original Coding | New Coding |
| :--- | :--- |
| No qualifications | No qualification |
| Below GCSE | No qualification |
| GCSE | GCSE/equiv |
| A-level | A-level/equiv |
| Undergraduate | Undergrad |
| Postgrad | Postgrad |

## Appendix B: Demonstration

## Regression results

Table B1: BSA and BES Scales Regressed on Education

|  | BSA Left-Right | BES Left-Right | BSA Lib-Auth | BES Lib-Auth |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | $1.31^{* * *}$ | $1.65^{* * *}$ | $2.82^{* * *}$ | $2.26^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.02)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| GCSE/Equiv | $0.22^{* * *}$ | 0.01 | $-0.23^{* * *}$ | 0.09 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.07)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.07)$ |
| A-level/Equiv | $0.30^{* * *}$ | $-0.12^{* *}$ | $-0.32^{* * *}$ | $-0.23^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.06)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ |
| Undergrad | $0.27^{* * *}$ | 0.02 | $-0.68^{* * *}$ | $-0.40^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Postgrad | $0.24^{* * *}$ | -0.00 | $-0.84^{* * *}$ | $-0.70^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.06)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.05)$ |
| R $^{2}$ | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 0.12 |
| Adj. R |  | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.13 |
| Num. obs. | 3123 | 1806 | 3125 | 0.12 |
| $* * *<0.00,{ }^{* *}$ | $*<0.05$ |  | 1931 |  |

${ }^{* * *} p<0.001 ;{ }^{* *} p<0.01 ;{ }^{*} p<0.05$

## Demonstration Robustness

## Indicators common to both datasets:

- Ind1: There is one law for the rich and one for the poor
- Ind2: Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values
- Ind3: Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards
- Ind4: For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence
- Ind5: People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences

Table B2: Regression of Survey Membership on Common Indicators

|  | OLS | Logit | Probit |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | 0.56 | 0.25 | 0.16 |
|  | $(0.03)$ | $(0.11)$ | $(0.07)$ |
| Ind1 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.03 |
|  | $(0.01)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| Ind2 | -0.00 | -0.02 | -0.01 |
|  | $(0.01)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| Ind3 | -0.01 | -0.05 | -0.03 |
|  | $(0.01)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| Ind4 | -0.02 | -0.06 | -0.04 |
|  | $(0.01)$ | $(0.02)$ | $(0.01)$ |
| Ind5 | 0.04 | 0.16 | 0.10 |
|  | $(0.01)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.01 |  |  |
| Adj. R |  |  |  |
| Num. obs. | 0.00 |  |  |
| AIC | 5170 | 5170 | 5170 |
| BIC |  | 7039.76 | 7040.06 |
| Log Likelihood |  | 7079.07 | 7079.37 |
| Deviance |  | -3513.88 | -3514.03 |

Table B3: Regression of Scales on Survey Month

|  | Left-Right | Lib-Auth |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | 1.64 | 2.04 |
|  | $(0.02)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| Aug | -0.03 | 0.00 |
|  | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Sep | -0.04 | 0.04 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.05)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Adj. R |  |  |
| Num. obs. | -0.00 | -0.00 |

## Appendix C: Unit Intercept Confirmatory Factor

## Analysis

The standard confirmatory factor analysis model is given in its linear form as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{i j}=\lambda_{j 1} \eta_{i 1}+\ldots+\lambda_{j m} \eta_{i m}+\epsilon_{i j} \tag{??revisited}
\end{equation*}
$$

Which is the common factor model discussed in the main body of the paper. The assumptions of this model are:

1. The means of the common factors are 0
2. The common factors are normally distributed
3. The means of the unique components are 0
4. The unique components are normally distributed
5. The unique components are uncorrelated with the common factors
6. The unique components are uncorrelated with each other

The model can be expressed in a more compact matrix form:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{x}=\boldsymbol{\Lambda} \boldsymbol{\eta}+\boldsymbol{\epsilon} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $\mathbf{x}$ is the $p \times 1$ vector of indicators, $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}$ is the $p \times m$ matrix of factor loadings, $\boldsymbol{\eta}$ is the $m \times 1$ vector of factor scores, and $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}$ is the $p \times 1$ vector of unique components. In turn, we can further express the model in terms of covariance matrices:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Sigma=\Lambda \Psi \Lambda^{\prime}+\Theta_{\epsilon} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}$ is the $p \times p$ variance-covariance matrix of the indicators, $\boldsymbol{\psi}$ is the $m \times m$ variance-covariance matrix of the common factors, and $\boldsymbol{\Theta}_{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}$ is the $p \times p$ variance-covariance matrix of unique components which by assumption 6 is a diagonal matrix. When estimated with maximum likelihood (ML), assuming no (further) restrictions are placed on the latent variables means the discrepancy function minimised is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{M L}=\ln |\mathbf{S}|-\ln |\boldsymbol{\Sigma}|+\operatorname{trace}\left(\boldsymbol{S} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-\mathbf{1}}\right)-p \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $\mathbf{S}$ is the model-implied variance-covariance matrix and $p$ is the number of indicators.

## Person Intercept CFA

As discussed in the main body of the paper, unit intercept CFA is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{i j}=\lambda_{j c} \eta_{i c}+1 \eta_{i a}+\epsilon_{i j} \tag{??revisited}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where factor $c$ would be the common factor and factor $a$ would be the person intercept factor. Maydeu-Olivares and Coffman introduce three further
assumptions for this model relative to regular CFA, which deserve discussion. The first two are:
7. The mean of the unit-intercepts is 0
8. The unit intercepts are uncorrelated with the unique components

Thus far, these are simply assumptions 1 and 5 repackaged for treating the unit-intercept factor separately. However, Maydeu-Olivares and Coffman make a further assumption:
9. The unit intercepts are uncorrelated with the common factor(s)

This assumption is explained in part by Maydeu-Olivares and COffman's choice of language for the model. As discussed in the main body of the paper, they specifically refer to the model as a random-intercept model and clearly are aiming to draw a parallel with multilevel regression modelling in their description of the unit-intercept confirmatory factor analysis model (indeed, their formulae reflect this too). However, as discussed in the main body of the paper, this comparison is not only unnecessary but arguably limits the utility of the model. I therefore drop this assumption and utilise the terminology person intercept instead.

To identify the scales of the common factors in the person intercept model, the variances of the common factors are constrained to 1 (as opposed to their first loading being constrained to 1 ). By contrast, the variance of the unitintercept is freely estimated. The important feature of such a model is that the loading of the unit-intercept factor is constrained across indicators. A method of creating such an intercept while constraining the unit-intercept variance to 1 would simply be to apply equality constraints to the unit-intercept loadings, such that they were equal across all indicators:

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{i j}=\lambda_{j c} \eta_{i c}+\lambda_{a} \eta_{i a}+\epsilon_{i j} \tag{??revisited}
\end{equation*}
$$

As stated in the main body of the paper, the difference between (??) and (??) is that instead of a loading of ' 1 ' on $\eta_{i a}$, there is now a freely estimated loading lacking a ' j ' subscript as it is common to all indicators.

## Ordinal Confirmatory Factor Analysis

One potential flaw of the person intercept CFA model is that it does not fully take into account the ordinal nature of the indicator variables typical for Likert scales. In ordinal CFA, the relationship between the latent variables and the observed categories are assumed to exist via a threshold relationship:

$$
\begin{align*}
& x_{i j}^{*}=\lambda_{j 1} \eta_{i 1}+\ldots+\lambda_{j m} \eta_{i m}+\epsilon_{i j}  \tag{4}\\
& x_{i j}=K \quad \text { if } \quad \tau_{j k}<x_{i j}^{*}<\tau_{j k+1}
\end{align*}
$$

Where $x_{i j}^{*}$ is the latent variable underlying $x_{i j}, K$ is one of the t values $x_{i j}$ can take on, $\tau_{j k}$ is the kth threshold for indicator $\mathrm{j}, \tau_{j 0}=-\infty$ and $\tau_{j t}=\infty$.

Ordinal CFA makes similar assumptions to continuous CFA:

1. The means of the common factors are 0
2. The common factors are normally distributed
3. The means of the unique components are 0
4. The unique components are normally distributed
5. The unique components are uncorrelated with the common factors
6. The unique components are uncorrelated with each other

It follows that $x_{i j}^{*}$ is normally distributed with mean 0 and the covariance matrix:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\boldsymbol{\Sigma}=\boldsymbol{\Lambda} \boldsymbol{\Psi} \Lambda^{\prime}+\Theta_{\epsilon} \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

To identify the variances of the unique components, we set

$$
\begin{equation*}
\boldsymbol{\Theta}_{\epsilon}=\mathbf{I}-\operatorname{diag}\left(\boldsymbol{\Lambda} \mathbf{\Psi} \boldsymbol{\Lambda}^{\prime}\right) \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

such that the covariance matrix becomes a correlation matrix $\mathbf{P}$.
Ordinal CFA is often estimated in a three-step procedure. First, the thresholds are estimated alone using maximum likelihood. The thresholds are often estimated by the corresponding percentage of respondents in each category of the ordinal variable. Second, the polychoric correlation matrix of the observed indicators is estimated via maximum likelihood. Third, assuming no restrictions are placed on the thresholds, a least squares discrepancy function based on the polychoric correlations can be used:

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{L S}=(\hat{\boldsymbol{p}}-\boldsymbol{p}(\boldsymbol{\theta}))^{\prime} \boldsymbol{V}(\hat{\boldsymbol{p}}-\boldsymbol{p}(\boldsymbol{\theta})) \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $\hat{p}$ is the polychoric correlation matrix estimated in the second step, $p(\theta)$ is the model-implied correlation matrix, $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ represents the parameters of the model, and $\boldsymbol{V}$ is a weighting matrix. The choice of weighting matrix determines the exact estimation method being used. If $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Gamma}}$ is an estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix of estimated polychoric correlations, then:

- Weighted Least Squares (WLS): $\boldsymbol{V}=\hat{\boldsymbol{\Gamma}}$
- Diagonally Weighted Least Squares (DWLS): $\mathbf{V}=\operatorname{diag}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\Gamma}})^{-1 / 2}$
- Unweighted Least Squares (ULS): $\boldsymbol{V}=\boldsymbol{I}$

Similarly to regular CFA, implementing the unit intercept in ordinal CFA is relatively straightforward. We can either set the loadings of the unit-intercept factor to 1 while freeing its variance:

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{i j}^{*}=\lambda_{j c} \eta_{i c}+1 \eta_{i a}+\epsilon_{i j} \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

Or alternatively we can can constrain its variance to 1 while constraining the loadings to be equal but freely estimating their value:

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{i j}^{*}=\lambda_{j c} \eta_{i c}+\lambda_{a} \eta_{i a}+\epsilon_{i j} \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

Continuing with the convention established above, for the remainder of this paper I refer to these models as (8) OCFA1 and (9) OCFA2.

## Appendix D: Correction

Identifying Scale CFA

Table D1: Zero CFA Check

|  | Model |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Estimate | Std. Err. |
|  | Loadings |  |
| Zero |  |  |
| zero1 | 0.41 | 0.01 |
| zero4 | 0.49 | 0.02 |
| zero5 | -0.53 | 0.02 |
| zero7 | 0.61 | 0.01 |
| zero9 | -0.59 | 0.01 |
| zerol1 | -0.58 | 0.02 |
| Acq |  |  |
| zero1 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| zero4 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| zero5 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| zero7 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| zero9 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| zero11 | $1.00{ }^{+}$ |  |
|  | Latent | ariances |
| Zero | $1.00{ }^{+}$ |  |
| Acq | 0.10 | 0.00 |
|  | Fit Indices |  |
| $\chi^{2}$ (df) | 253.63 |  |
| CFI | 0.96 |  |
| TLI | 0.93 |  |
| RMSEA | 0.07 |  |
| Scaled $\chi^{2}$ (df) | 181.16(8) |  |

## CFA Results

## Zero-Sum CFA Results

Table D3: Zero-Sum CFA1

|  | Model |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Estimate $\quad$ Std. Err. |  |
| $\underline{\text { Loadings }}$ |  |  |
| zero7 | 0.58 | 0.01 |
|  | 14 |  |


| zero1 | 0.40 | 0.01 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| zero4 | 0.48 | 0.02 |
| zero11 | -0.59 | 0.02 |
| zero5 | -0.55 | 0.02 |
| zero9 | -0.60 | 0.01 |
| LeftCorrected |  |  |
| lr1 | 0.81 | 0.02 |
| lr2 | 0.70 | 0.01 |
| lr3 | 0.81 | 0.01 |
| lr4 | 0.83 | 0.01 |
| lr5 | 0.61 | 0.01 |
| AuthCorrected |  |  |
| al1 | 0.85 | 0.01 |
| al2 | 0.99 | 0.02 |
| al3 | 0.73 | 0.01 |
| al4 | 0.56 | 0.02 |
| al5 | 0.72 | 0.01 |

Acq

| zero7 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| zero1 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| zero4 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| zero11 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| zero5 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| zero9 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| lr1 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| lr2 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| $\operatorname{lr} 3$ | $1.00^{+}$ |


| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| $\operatorname{lr} 5$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al1 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al2 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al3 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al4 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al5 | $1.00^{+}$ |
|  | Latent Variances |
| Z | $1.00^{+}$ |
| LeftCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |
| AuthCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |
| Acq | 0.08 0.00 |
|  | $\underline{\text { Fit Indices }}$ |
| $\chi^{2}(\mathrm{df})$ | 3134.95 |
| CFI | 0.90 |
| TLI | 0.89 |
| RMSEA | 0.07 |
| Scaled $\chi^{2}$ (df) | 2641.83(103) |

Table D4: Zero-Sum CFA2

| Model |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :--- |
|  | Estimate $\quad$ Std. Err. |  |
| $\underline{\text { Loadings }}$ |  |  |
| Z |  |  |
| zero7 | 0.67 | 0.05 |
| zero1 | 0.50 | 0.05 |


| zero4 | 0.60 | 0.05 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| zero11 | -0.49 | 0.05 |
| zero5 | -0.44 | 0.05 |
| zero9 | -0.50 | 0.05 |
| LeftCorrected |  |  |
| $\operatorname{lr} 1$ | 0.83 | 0.02 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | 0.74 | 0.02 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 3$ | 0.85 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.87 | 0.02 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 5$ | 0.65 | 0.02 |
| AuthCorrected |  |  |
| al1 | 0.87 | 0.02 |
| al2 | 1.02 | 0.03 |
| al3 | 0.75 | 0.02 |
| al4 | 0.57 | 0.02 |
| al5 | 0.74 | 0.02 |
| Acq |  |  |
| zero7 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| zero1 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| zero4 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| zero11 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| zero5 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| zero9 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 1$ | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| 1 l 3 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.32 | 0.02 |


| lr5 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| al1 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| al2 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| al3 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| al4 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
| al5 | 0.32 | 0.02 |
|  | Latent Variances |  |
| Z | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| LeftCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| AuthCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ | $1.00^{+}$ |


|  | Fit Indices |
| :--- | :---: |
| $\chi^{2}(\mathrm{df})$ | 2705.09 |
| CFI | 0.92 |
| TLI | 0.90 |
| RMSEA | 0.07 |
| Scaled $\chi^{2}(\mathrm{df})$ | $2307.25(97)$ |

${ }^{+}$Fixed parameter

Table D5: Zero-Sum OCFA1

| Model |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Estimate $\quad$ Std. Err. |  |
| $\underline{\text { Loadings }}$ |  |  |
| $\underline{Z}$ |  |  |
| zero7 | 0.70 | 0.01 |
| zero1 | 0.45 | 0.01 |
| zero4 | 0.52 | 0.01 |


| zero11 | -0.57 | 0.01 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| zero5 | -0.59 | 0.01 |
| zero9 | -0.67 | 0.01 |
| LeftCorrected |  |  |
| lr1 | 0.67 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | 0.81 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 3$ | 0.83 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.81 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 5$ | 0.67 | 0.01 |

AuthCorrected

| al1 | 0.80 | 0.01 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| al2 | 0.70 | 0.01 |
| al3 | 0.75 | 0.01 |
| al4 | 0.50 | 0.01 |
| al5 | 0.79 | 0.01 |

Acq

| zero7 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| zero1 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| zero4 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| zero11 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| zero5 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| zero9 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| lr1 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| lr2 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| $\operatorname{lr} 3$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| $\operatorname{lr} 5$ | $1.00^{+}$ |


| al1 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| al2 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al3 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al4 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al5 | $1.00^{+}$ |


|  | Latent Variances |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Z | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| LeftCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| AuthCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| Acq | 0.05 | 0.00 |

Fit Indices
$\chi^{2}(\mathrm{df}) \quad 6344.31$
CFI 0.90

TLI 0.92
RMSEA 0.08
Scaled $\chi^{2}(\mathrm{df}) \quad 1855.01(167)$
${ }^{+}$Fixed parameter

Table D6: Zero-Sum OCFA2

| Model |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Estimate | Std. Err. |
| $\underline{\text { Loadings }}$ |  |  |
| $\underline{Z}$ | 0.69 | 0.03 |
| zero7 | 0.49 | 0.03 |
| zero1 | 0.61 | 0.03 |
| zero4 | -0.54 | 0.03 |


| zero5 | -0.55 | 0.03 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| zero9 | -0.70 | 0.03 |
| LeftCorrected |  |  |
| lr1 | 0.78 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | 0.86 | 0.01 |
| lr3 | 0.90 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.85 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 5$ | 0.68 | 0.01 |
| AuthCorrected |  |  |
| al1 | 0.81 | 0.01 |
| al2 | 0.74 | 0.01 |
| al3 | 0.76 | 0.01 |
| al4 | 0.49 | 0.01 |
| al5 | 0.78 | 0.01 |
| Acq |  |  |
| zero7 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| zero1 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| zero4 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| zero11 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| zero5 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| zero9 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 1$ | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| lr3 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| lr5 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| al1 | 0.35 | 0.01 |


| al2 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| al3 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| al4 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| al5 | 0.35 | 0.01 |
|  | Latent Variances |  |
| Z | $1.00^{+}$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| LeftCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| AuthCorrected | 3190.44 |  |
| Acq Indices |  |  |
|  | 0.95 |  |
| $\chi^{2}($ df $)$ | 0.94 |  |
| CFI | 0.07 |  |
| TLI | $3933.42(97)$ |  |
| RMSEA |  |  |
| Scaled $\chi^{2}($ df $)$ |  |  |

${ }^{+}$Fixed parameter

Table D2: Empathy CFA Check

|  | Model |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Estimate | Std. Err. |
| Empathy | Loadings |  |
| em1 | 0.30 | 0.01 |
| em2 | 0.32 | 0.01 |
| em3 | 0.30 | 0.01 |
| em4 | -0.34 | 0.01 |
| em5 | 0.29 | 0.01 |
| em6 | 0.25 | 0.01 |
| em7 | -0.45 | 0.01 |
| em8 | -0.48 | 0.01 |
| em9 | -0.39 | 0.01 |
| em10 | -0.47 | 0.01 |
| Acq | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| em1 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| em2 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| em3 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| em4 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| em5 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| em6 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| em7 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| em8 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| em9 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| em10 | $\underline{\text { Latent Variances }}$ |  |
| Empathy | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| Acq | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| $\chi^{2}($ df $)$ | 2268.03 |  |
| CFI | 0.87 |  |
| TLI | 0.83 |  |
| RMSEA | 0.12 |  |
| Scaled $\chi^{2}($ df $)$ | $1513.06(34)$ |  |
| + Fixed parameter |  |  |
|  |  |  |

## Empathy CFA Results

Table D7: Empathy CFA1

Model

|  | Estimate | Std. Err. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Loadings |  |
| E |  |  |
| em1 | 0.29 | 0.01 |
| em2 | 0.31 | 0.01 |
| em3 | 0.29 | 0.01 |
| em4 | -0.34 | 0.01 |
| em5 | 0.28 | 0.01 |
| em6 | 0.25 | 0.01 |
| em7 | -0.46 | 0.01 |
| em8 | -0.49 | 0.01 |
| em9 | -0.40 | 0.01 |
| em10 | -0.48 | 0.01 |
| LeftCorrected |  |  |
| $\operatorname{lr} 1$ | 0.83 | 0.02 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | 0.70 | 0.01 |
| lr3 | 0.84 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.82 | 0.01 |
| lr5 | 0.65 | 0.02 |
| AuthCorrected |  |  |
| al1 | 0.90 | 0.02 |
| al2 | 1.03 | 0.02 |
| al3 | 0.77 | 0.02 |
| al4 | 0.63 | 0.02 |
| al5 | 0.77 | 0.01 |
| Acq |  |  |
| em1 | $1.00^{+}$ |  |


| em2 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| em3 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| em4 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| em5 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| em6 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| em7 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| em8 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| em9 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| em10 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| $\operatorname{lr} 1$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| 1 l 3 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| $\operatorname{lr} 5$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al1 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al2 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al3 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al4 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al5 | $1.00^{+}$ |
|  | Latent Variances |
| E | $1.00^{+}$ |
| LeftCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |
| AuthCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |
| Acq | $0.04 \quad 0.00$ |
|  | $\underline{\text { Fit Indices }}$ |
| $\chi^{2}(\mathrm{df})$ | 4227.66 |
| CFI | 0.89 |


| TLI | 0.87 |
| :--- | :--- |
| RMSEA | 0.07 |

Scaled $\chi^{2}(\mathrm{df}) \quad 3470.77(169)$
${ }^{+}$Fixed parameter

Table D8: Empathy CFA2

|  | Model |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Estimate | Std. Err. |
|  | Loadings |  |
| E |  |  |
| em1 | 0.13 | 0.05 |
| em2 | 0.16 | 0.05 |
| em3 | 0.14 | 0.05 |
| em4 | -0.49 | 0.05 |
| em5 | 0.13 | 0.05 |
| em6 | 0.10 | 0.05 |
| em7 | -0.61 | 0.05 |
| em8 | -0.64 | 0.05 |
| em9 | -0.55 | 0.05 |
| em10 | -0.63 | 0.05 |
| LeftCorrected |  |  |
| lr1 | 0.85 | 0.02 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | 0.72 | 0.02 |
| lr3 | 0.85 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.83 | 0.02 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 5$ | 0.67 | 0.02 |
| AuthCorrected |  |  |


| al1 | 0.92 | 0.02 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| al2 | 1.08 | 0.03 |
| al3 | 0.79 | 0.02 |
| al4 | 0.65 | 0.02 |
| al5 | 0.80 | 0.02 |
| Acq |  |  |
| em1 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| em2 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| em3 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| em4 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| em5 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| em6 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| em7 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| em8 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| em9 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| em10 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| lr1 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| lr2 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| lr3 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| lr5 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| al1 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| al2 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| al3 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| al4 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
| al5 | 0.27 | 0.03 |
|  | $\underline{\text { Latent Variances }}$ |  |


| E | $1.00^{+}$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| LeftCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |
| AuthCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |
| Acq | $1.00^{+}$ |
|  | Fit Indices |
| $\chi^{2}($ df $)$ | 3846.21 |
| CFI | 0.90 |
| TLI | 0.88 |
| RMSEA | 0.07 |
| Scaled $\chi^{2}($ df $)$ | $3164.99(163)$ |

${ }^{+}$Fixed parameter

Table D9: Empathy OCFA1

| Model |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Estimate | Std. Err. |
| Loadings |  |  |
| E |  |  |
| em1 | 0.61 | 0.01 |
| em2 | 0.69 | 0.01 |
| em3 | 0.66 | 0.01 |
| em4 | -0.53 | 0.01 |
| em5 | 0.63 | 0.01 |
| em6 | 0.48 | 0.01 |
| em7 | -0.77 | 0.01 |
| em8 | -0.78 | 0.01 |
| em9 | -0.56 | 0.01 |
| em10 | -0.78 | 0.01 |

## LeftCorrected

| $\operatorname{lr} 1$ | 0.68 | 0.01 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | 0.80 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 3$ | 0.85 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.81 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 5$ | 0.68 | 0.01 |
| AuthCorrected |  |  |
| al1 | 0.81 | 0.01 |
| al2 | 0.73 | 0.01 |
| al3 | 0.76 | 0.01 |
| al4 | 0.50 | 0.01 |
| al5 | 0.81 | 0.01 |

Acq
em1 $\quad 1.00^{+}$
em2 $1.00^{+}$
em3 $1.00^{+}$
em4 $1.00^{+}$
em5 $1.00^{+}$
em6 $\quad 1.00^{+}$
em7 $1.00^{+}$
em8 $1.00^{+}$
em9 $1.00^{+}$
em10 $1.00^{+}$

| $\operatorname{lr} 1$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| $\operatorname{lr} 3$ | $1.00^{+}$ |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | $1.00^{+}$ |


| lr5 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| al1 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al2 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al3 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al4 | $1.00^{+}$ |
| al5 | $1.00^{+}$ |
|  | $\underline{\text { Latent Variances }}$ |
| E | $1.00^{+}$ |
| LeftCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |
| AuthCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |
| Acq | 0.04 |


|  | Fit Indices |
| :--- | :---: |
| $\chi^{2}(\mathrm{df})$ | 7500.96 |
| CFI | 0.90 |
| TLI | 0.92 |
| RMSEA | 0.08 |
| Scaled $\chi^{2}(\mathrm{df})$ | $1682.38(239)$ |

${ }^{+}$Fixed parameter

Table D10: Empathy OCFA2

| Model |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Estimate $\quad$ Std. Err. |  |
| $\underline{\text { Loadings }}$ |  |  |
| E |  |  |
| em1 | 0.65 | 0.04 |
| em2 | 0.73 | 0.04 |
| em3 | 0.71 | 0.04 |


| em4 | -0.49 | 0.04 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| em5 | 0.68 | 0.04 |
| em6 | 0.53 | 0.04 |
| em7 | -0.73 | 0.04 |
| em8 | -0.74 | 0.04 |
| em9 | -0.52 | 0.04 |
| em10 | -0.74 | 0.04 |

## LeftCorrected

| $\operatorname{lr} 1$ | 0.79 | 0.01 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | 0.88 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 3$ | 0.95 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.89 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 5$ | 0.73 | 0.01 |

AuthCorrected

| al1 | 0.87 | 0.01 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| al2 | 0.75 | 0.01 |
| al3 | 0.83 | 0.01 |
| al4 | 0.59 | 0.01 |
| al5 | 0.87 | 0.01 |

Acq

| em1 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| em2 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| em3 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| em4 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| em5 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| em6 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| em7 | 0.33 | 0.01 |


| em8 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| em9 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| em10 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 1$ | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 2$ | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 3$ | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 4$ | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| $\operatorname{lr} 5$ | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| al1 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| al2 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| al3 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| al4 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| al5 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
|  | Latent Variances |  |
| E | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| LeftCorrected | $1.00{ }^{+}$ |  |
| AuthCorrected | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
| Acq | $1.00^{+}$ |  |
|  | Fit Indices |  |
| $\chi^{2}(\mathrm{df})$ | 4465.90 |  |
| CFI | 0.94 |  |
| TLI | 0.93 |  |
| RMSEA | 0.08 |  |
| Scaled $\chi^{2}$ (df) | 4111.71(163) |  |

## Correlations

Table D11: Zero-Sum Left-Right

|  | CFA1 | OCFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA2 |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CFA1 |  |  |  |  |
| OCFA1 | 0.991 |  |  |  |
| CFA2 | 0.987 | 0.974 |  |  |
| OCFA2 | 0.984 | 0.984 | 0.984 |  |

Table D12: Zero-Sum Left-Right

|  | CFA1 | OCFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA2 |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CFA1 |  |  |  |  |
| OCFA1 | 0.991 |  |  |  |
| CFA2 | 0.987 | 0.974 |  |  |
| OCFA2 | 0.984 | 0.984 | 0.984 |  |

Table D13: Zero-Sum Left-Right

|  | CFA1 | OCFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA2 |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CFA1 |  |  |  |  |
| OCFA1 | 0.991 |  |  |  |
| CFA2 | 0.987 | 0.974 |  |  |
| OCFA2 | 0.984 | 0.984 | 0.984 |  |

Table D14: Zero-Sum Left-Right

|  | CFA1 | OCFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA2 |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CFA1 |  |  |  |  |
| OCFA1 | 0.991 |  |  |  |
| CFA2 | 0.987 | 0.974 |  |  |
| OCFA2 | 0.984 | 0.984 | 0.984 |  |

## Marginal Distributions

Figure D1: Density Plots of Left-Right Factors from Correction Models


Figure D2: Density Plots of Lib-Auth Factors from Correction Models


Regression Results

Table D15: Zero-Sum Left-Right

|  | Raw | CFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA1 | OCFA2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | 1.12 | 1.55 | 1.61 | 1.58 | 1.78 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Below GCSE | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
|  | $(0.07)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.06)$ | $(0.05)$ |
| GCSE/Equiv | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.06 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| A-level/Equiv | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.09 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Undergrad | 0.15 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.03 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Postgrad | 0.13 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | -0.04 |
|  | $(0.06)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Adj. R |  | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 |

Table D16: Empathy Left-Right

|  | Raw | CFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA1 | OCFA2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | 1.08 | 1.62 | 1.75 | 1.59 | 1.87 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Below GCSE | 0.17 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.07 |
|  | $(0.08)$ | $(0.06)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.06)$ | $(0.05)$ |
| GCSE/Equiv | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.06 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ |
| A-level/Equiv | 0.18 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.07 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ |
| Undergrad | 0.22 | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.09 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ |
| Postgrad | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.03 |
|  | $(0.06)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Adj. R |  | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. $^{3}$ | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 |

Table D17: Zero-Sum Libertarian-Authoritarian

|  | Raw | CFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA1 | OCFA2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | 3.05 | 2.58 | 2.51 | 2.62 | 2.35 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Below GCSE | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.06 | -0.06 |
|  | $(0.07)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.05)$ |
| GCSE/Equiv | -0.13 | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.09 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| A-level/Equiv | -0.45 | -0.31 | -0.30 | -0.33 | -0.28 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Undergrad | -0.76 | -0.53 | -0.52 | -0.57 | -0.47 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Postgrad | -1.15 | -0.79 | -0.76 | -0.82 | -0.67 |
|  | $(0.06)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.12 |
| Adj. R |  | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 |
| Num. obs. | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 |

## Education Recode Regression Results

Table D18: Empathy Libertarian-Authoritarian

|  | Raw | CFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA1 | OCFA2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | 3.11 | 2.60 | 2.44 | 2.59 | 2.29 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Below GCSE | -0.07 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.02 |
|  | $(0.08)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.06)$ | $(0.05)$ |
| GCSE/Equiv | -0.14 | -0.09 | -0.10 | -0.11 | -0.07 |
|  | $(0.06)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| A-level/Equiv | -0.53 | -0.34 | -0.34 | -0.37 | -0.27 |
|  | $(0.06)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Undergrad | -0.77 | -0.51 | -0.50 | -0.55 | -0.41 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Postgrad | -1.24 | -0.85 | -0.82 | -0.88 | -0.67 |
|  | $(0.06)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.14 |
| Adj. R |  | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.15 |
| Num. obs. | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 |

Table D19: Zero-Sum Left-Right Alternative

|  | Raw | CFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA1 | OCFA2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | 1.14 | 1.56 | 1.62 | 1.60 | 1.80 |
|  | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.02)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| GCSE/Equiv | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.04 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| A-level/Equiv | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.07 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Undergrad | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.01 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Postgrad | 0.12 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.05 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Adj. R ${ }^{2}$ | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 |

Table D20: Empathy Left-Right Alternative

|  | Raw | CFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA1 | OCFA2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | 1.14 | 1.65 | 1.79 | 1.63 | 1.90 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| GCSE/Equiv | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| A-level/Equiv | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.04 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Undergrad | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.07 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Postgrad | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
|  | $(0.06)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Adj. R |  | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 |

Table D21: Zero-Sum Libertarian-Authoritarian Alternative

|  | Raw | CFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA1 | OCFA2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | 3.03 | 2.56 | 2.50 | 2.60 | 2.33 |
|  | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.02)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| GCSE/Equiv | -0.11 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.09 | -0.07 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| A-level/Equiv | -0.44 | -0.29 | -0.28 | -0.31 | -0.26 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Undergrad | -0.74 | -0.52 | -0.50 | -0.55 | -0.45 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Postgrad | -1.13 | -0.77 | -0.74 | -0.80 | -0.65 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.12 |
| Adj. R |  | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 |
| Num. obs. | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 | 4965 |

Table D22: Empathy Libertarian-Authoritarian Alternative

|  | Raw | CFA1 | CFA2 | OCFA1 | OCFA2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercept | 3.08 | 2.59 | 2.42 | 2.57 | 2.28 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| GCSE/Equiv | -0.12 | -0.08 | -0.08 | -0.08 | -0.06 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| A-level/Equiv | -0.50 | -0.33 | -0.32 | -0.35 | -0.26 |
|  | $(0.05)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Undergrad | -0.74 | -0.50 | -0.48 | -0.53 | -0.40 |
|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| Postgrad | -1.21 | -0.84 | -0.80 | -0.86 | -0.66 |
|  | $(0.06)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.03)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.14 |
| Adj. R |  | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.15 |
| Num. obs. | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 | 3847 |

