Positivism

Lezsek Kołakowski defines Positivism as having four rules:

1. The rule of phenomenalism: that there is no difference between ‘essence’ and ‘phenomenon’. There are no occult realities beyond what is manifested in experience.
2. The rule of nominalism: insights formulated in general terms cannot have any referents other than concrete individual objects. The study of the behaviour of abstractions (or ‘ideal situations’) such as ‘triangle’ is not the study of Platonic forms with a reality of their own, but only helps us in understanding real entities which approximate the abstractions more or less closely. Kołakowski calls this a consequence of the first rule.
3. The rule that refuses to call value judgements and normative statements knowledge. This is a consequence of phenomenalism and nominalism, because things like ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘beauty’, ‘noble’ and so on are abstractions or generalisations from experience rather than things in our experience themselves.
4. Belief in the essential unity of the scientific method. Most commonly, this shows up as the belief that the methods for acquiring valid knowledge are the same in all spheres of experience.

Currently Reading:

• Kołakowski, L. (1972) Positivist Philosophy From Hume to the Vienna Circle. Publisher: Pelican Books

To Read:

• Edmonds, D. (2020) The Murder of Professor Schlick: The Rise and Fall of the Vienna Circle